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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
RICHARD WARREN PEARSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20041096-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from the denial of a post-judgment order following conviction 
entered on guilty pleas to three counts of misuse of public money, one count of theft, and 
one court of communications fraud, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-8-402, 76-6-404, and 76-10-1801, respectively (R. 2-6) (statutes attached in 
Addendum A). This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The trial court imposed at sentencing the total restitution figure contained 
in the presentence investigation report without objection by defendant and 
provided for a restitution hearing in the event post-sentencing negotiations 
failed. The court later denied defendant's post-sentencing motion for a 
restitution hearing and reaffirmed its restitution order. 
Point 1: Did the sentencing court properly deny defendant's post-sentencing 
request for a restitution hearing where the sentencing court ordered that a restitution 
hearing would occur if one was required following post-sentencing negotiations, and 
defendant fails to establish that restitution remained undecided when he requested a 
hearing seven months later? 
This Court will not disturb a restitution order unless the trial court abused its 
discretion or exceeded its authority. See State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, \ 5, 60 P.3d 
582; State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, \ 7, 40 P.3d 1143; State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 
273, «| 7,12 P.3d 110, aff'd, 2002 UT 98, 61 P.3d 1000. This Court reviews a trial court's 
interpretation of the restitution statutes for correctness. See Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, 
1f5. 
Defendant bears the burden of providing record support for his claim of error, 
absent which this Court cannot rule on the claim. See State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 
(Utah 1993). 
Point 2: Does the record sufficiently reveal the reasoning behind the restitution 
decision and reasonably support the assumption that the sentencing court considered the 
relevant statutory factors in reaching its decision? 
This issue was not raised below and, thus, may be reviewed only for plain error. 
Defendant must establish an error that 1) should have been obvious to the trial court, and 
2) prejudiced him. See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 363 (Utah App. 1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The issues involve the restitution provisions in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 
(West 2004), a copy of which is attached in Addendum B.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with three counts of misusing public money, one count of 
theft, and one count of communications fraud, all second degree felonies, for conduct 
occurring between October 15, 1999, and May 23, 2003 (R. 2-6). He waived his 
preliminary hearing and ultimately entered guilty pleas to all five charges (R. 22, 32-33, 
34-41). The court ordered preparation of a presentence investigation report (R. 33) 
(report attached at Addendum C). 
At sentencing on February 20, 2004, defendant stated that he "agree[d] with the 
recommendations in the pre-sentence report" involving probation and concurrent 
sentencing (R. 90: 3) (sentencing transcript attached at Addendum D). He noted that he 
found the report to be "thoughtful[,]" to be accurate in its recognition that defendant had 
no criminal history, and to be correct in its account of his motivations (id). 
before 2002, restitution proceedings were governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201, et seq. Thereafter, the Crime Victims Restitution Act was enacted to govern the 
imposition of restitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-101 et seq. (West 2004). 
Because the Act incorporates largely the same language as former section 76-3-201, 
earlier case law interpreting the former statute governs this case. See State v. Weeks, 
2002 UT 98, Tf 2 n.l, 61 P.3d 1000 (recognizing that the analysis with respect to section 
77-38a-302(3) and (4), among others, remains the same as under the previous statutes 
because "no substantive modifications were made to the provisions). 
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The prosecutor then pointed out: 
. . . I know the Court is well aware of this case, but the State, in a 
sense, is truly the victim in this case, as opposed to where we stand in place 
of the victim, where Mr. Pearson had the gate-keeper function at the 
Division of Alcohol Beverage Control, was responsible for improper use of 
State funds and in the discharge of his duties, misappropriated over 
$130,000, of which $53,793 went directly to his personal accounts. 
In addition, since these charges were filed, the A.B.C. was required 
to pay off a Costco credit card bill, the entirety of which were purchases for 
Mr. Pearson's personal benefit. That amounts to $6,856. We're requesting 
restitution in the amount of $60,649. 
I believe that Mr. Pearson is contesting the restitution and so we'd be 
asking the Court to set a restitution hearing. 
(R. 90: 4-5). Following a question by the court, the prosecutor clarified that the 
presentence investigation report's figure of $131,541.13 did not include the $6,800 figure 
(R. 90: 5). Instead, the number in the report was 
. . . the total amount misappropriated; however, the auditors also determined 
about 76,000 were improper disbursements, but went to the benefit of the 
department or other department members. And so, they're not quite sure [at 
the Utah State Auditor's Office] how to deal with that and your Honor's 
going to have to decide that at the restitution hearing. 
(id). 
The judge then sentenced defendant to serve five consecutive sentences of one-to-
fifteen years in prison, suspended the prison terms, and placed defendant on probation 
subject to, among other things, his payment of "restitution in the amount of $131,541.14 
until such time and if that number is modified by this Court" (R. 90: 6). Add. D. The 
court then clarified 
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I am of the view at this stage that the restitution sum will be as I've 
indicated unless I modify it and that leaves open the potential for 
negotiation between your lawyer and those at the State who do have 
knowledge about what their records reflect. If there is no satisfactory 
conclusion by either party, then you're to notify this Court, [defense 
counsel], and I will set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.... At which 
time, all of the claims will be inquired into and a determination will be 
made; but until and unless that occurs, the number is now specified. 
(R. 90: 7). Add. D. The hearing ended without a single objection by defendant. 
Defense counsel withdrew the following July (R.< 52-54), and in September—seven 
months after imposition of sentence—defendant, through new counsel, filed a motion for 
a restitution hearing and a request for discovery (R. 55-56) (both motions attached in 
Addendum E). He merely stated his request for a hearing and sought "documentation as 
to how the [restitution amount of $131,541.13 was calculated" (id). The State 
responded that the request was untimely and was barred by laches (R. 57-59), and the 
court set the matter for hearing (R. 60-61). 
At the November hearing on the motion, defendant argued that the statute does not 
mandate that a request for a restitution hearing be made at sentencing and that the State's 
laches argument was not well-taken (R. 92: 2-3) (hearing transcript attached at 
Addendum F). Defense counsel then proffered: 
We've taken the liberty of having a C.P.A. work over all these 
materials and prepare what we believe is the accurate state of affairs as to 
what happened. And we are claiming that there is $25,000 that has been 
paid back [that] he's not getting credit for, that there's numerous pieces of 
merchandise, personalty, which he misappropriated by buying and all those 
items are in possession of the State. There's $40,000 worth of gym 
equipment, that's what it cost; another 15 or $20,000 worth of other 
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miscellaneous personalty, including but not limited to, the director's desk, 
which he is using at the present time, and a table, that's about $5,000. 
And we want, number one, obviously, to get some sort of relief over 
the $25,000 that we say has been repaid and also, some sort of set-off or 
possession of the items which were required to pay for of the personalty 
nature [sic]. 
(R. 92: 3-4). Add. F. The State responded: 
The defendant's attorney at [the sentencing hearing].. . had all the 
information and made no objection or request to review the restitution 
amount at that time. It is my opinion that the defendant's current situation 
needs to be taken up at AP&P, who is monitoring his restitution, if he 
should be credited with items that are in the possession of the State, I have 
no objection to that, but that is the concern of AP&P, not this Court or me. 
Therefore, I don't think a restitution hearing is the avenue that we 
need to follow in order to determine what exactly he owes. An inventory by 
AP&P of what the State has would be much more suitable. 
(R. 92: 5). Add. F. 
The judge took the matter under advisement, noting that he was "trying to grapple 
with the question of whether or not because now counsel has changed, there has been a 
waiver of the right under the statute to claim a restitution hearing" (R. 67-68; R. 92: 5). 
Add. F. 
The court thereafter ruled 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4), Defendant's request is 
untimely as the motion was not made, nor any objection voiced, until seven 
months after the sentencing. Moreover, the presentence report in this case 
provides an accurate outline of the amounts misused and their destinations, 
and defendant had access to this report and the discovery which detailed 
the State's accounting. Finally, in State v. Weeks, 2002 UT98, 61 P.3d 
1000, the Utah Supreme Court held that restitution based upon the 
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information in a presentence report is a sufficient basis upon which the 
Court may determine an order of restitution. 
(R. 69-70) (emphasis added) (order attached at Addendum G). Defendant timely 
appealed from this written order (R. 71-72). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
Defendant was employed at the Utah Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 
["DABC"] until May 23, 2003, as the general accountant (R. 4). His responsibilities 
included "making payments and accountings of public monies used to operate DABC" 
(id). 
DABC had an operating account and a petty cash account at Bank One (id.). 
Defendant had a personal bank account at Beehive Credit Union, together with an 
account for Sparta United Soccer to which he had access (id.). Prior to October 15, 1999, 
he opened an unofficial and unauthorized DABC account at the same credit union, 
naming himself as trustee for the DABC Candy Account and using his personal tax 
identification number/social security number (id.). Defendant claimed that the account 
was set up to handle proceeds from the candy machines, which proceeds were to be used 
to purchase additional candy for the machines, obtain fitness equipment, and fund 
Christmas incentives and gift certificates for DABC employees (id.). 
2Unless otherwise specified, all facts are taken from the probable cause statement 
on which the presentence investigation report was based (R. 4-6). 
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On March 13, 2003, Agent Doug Townsend, an Investigator for the State Bureau 
of Investigation, followed up on a confidential report that defendant was authorizing 
payment of DABC funds to pay for embroidery for Sparta United Soccer uniforms and 
equipment (id). He determined that a "hard audit" of the DABC books had not occurred 
for approximately three years, and the State Auditor's Office agreed to examine the 
accounts for the years between 1999 and 2002 (R. 4-5). 
That audit revealed a mishandling of public monies. Defendant would advance 
money to an employee from the petty cash account at Bank One, then put the repayment 
by the employee into defendant's personal accounts at the credit union (R. 5). He would 
also disburse money from the petty cash account and deposit it directly into his credit 
union accounts, use it to pay his personal bill at Costco, or apply it toward gift certificates 
for employee incentives (id.). 
DABC participated in a recycle incentive program in which it received money for 
recycling the cardboard boxes from State Liquor Stores (id.). Defendant intercepted the 
money sent to DABC and deposited it into his account and the Sparta Soccer account at 
the credit union (id.). 
On March 4, 2003, Ken Wynn, Director of the DABC, confronted defendant about 
the use of DABC funds to pay for the soccer uniforms and equipment (id.). Defendant 
assured him that Sparta United Soccer had reimbursed the DABC $25,777.22 for all of 
the money DABC had spent on its behalf (id.). The audit verified the payment to DABC, 
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but revealed that defendant had deposited only $6,755.32 of that amount into one of the 
credit union accounts (none of which was an authorized DABC account) and put the rest 
of the payment into the petty cash account at Bank One, which he later redistributed 
without documentation (R. 4-5). 
The audit also revealed that between 1999 and 2002, defendant disbursed money 
from the Bank One petty cash account, without documentation, as follows: 
-$1,040.00 deposited to the credit union candy account; 
-$3,139.00 cashed; 
-$6,550.00 cashed; 
-$9,390.00 advanced on wages to DABC employee; 
-$4,512.50 purchased employee gift certificates from Harmons for Christmas 
bonuses; 
-$6,160.00 to HRS/Costco on defendant's personal account; 
-$5,350.00 to DABC; 
-$18,107.66 one disbursement payable to defendant; and 
-$12,020.00 in cash back from various deposits. 
{Id.). When defendant advanced petty cash money to an employee, he would deposit that 
employee's paycheck into the credit union candy account, from which he disbursed funds 
to himself without documentation or written authority (R. 5-6). 
The audit revealed that defendant misappropriated approximately $131,541.13 
from DABC (R. 6). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I; This Court cannot review defendant's claim that the trial court 
erroneously denied his request for a restitution hearing because defendant fails to provide 
record support that he was entitled to the hearing at the time of his request. When the 
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prosecutor requested a restitution hearing at sentencing, the court provided that it would 
grant one if post-sentencing negotiations between the parties failed to settle the issue of 
restitution. Defendant's summary claim on appeal that those negotiations failed is 
entirely unsupported by the record and prevents this Court from reviewing his claim. The 
record supports a reasonable inference that negotiations not only occurred but were 
successfully concluded, negating any need for a restitution hearing. Accordingly, this 
Court is unable to review defendant's first argument. 
Point II: This Court should also refuse to reach defendant's claim that the 
sentencing court neither made a record of the reasoning behind its restitution decision nor 
considered the relevant statutory factors identified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b) 
& (c). First, defendant failed to make any timely or specific objection on either basis 
below, thereby robbing the sentencing court of any opportunity to address his concerns. 
Second, defendant fails to establish plain error on appeal where his argument is premised 
on the court's failure to put its restitution reasoning on the record. Here, the record 
adequately reveals the reasoning underlying the restitution order. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE ABSENCE OF RECORD SUPPORT FOR DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
CLAIM PREVENTS APPELLATE REVIEW 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a restitution 
hearing after having "promised" a hearing if post-sentencing negotiations "were 
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unproductive." Aplt. Br. at 11-17. This Court is unable to review the claim, however, 
because defendant fails to provide record support for a key part of his claim. 
Parties claiming error on appeal have a duty and responsibility to support their 
allegations with an adequate record. See State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 131 (Utah App. 
1997). "This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon 
alleged facts unsupported by the record.'" Id. (quoting State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 
(Utah 1986) (additional quotation omitted)). In the face of "an [inadequate record on 
appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below." State v. Miller, 718 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 
1995) (assuming regularity of proceedings below because appellant failed to include 
transcript on appeal), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
Many of the circumstances relevant to defendant's restitution claim are apparent on 
the record. Restitution was not likely to exceed the $131,541.13 amount noted in the 
presentence report. The issue throughout the proceedings below was whether defendant 
could obtain any credit for items purchased with the misappropriated funds but remaining in 
the possession of DABC. Defendant knew when he entered his guilty pleas that restitution 
would be imposed and could be as much as around $130,000.00 (R. 89:11-13). At the same 
time, defendant was working to obtain the credit or off-set (R. 89: 11-12). The parties had 
been negotiating the point and successfully requested that the court delay sentencing to 
permit continued negotiations (R. 89: 11-13). 
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The presentence investigation report included defendant's claim to a set off amount, 
and defendant elaborated on the matter in his written statement attached to the report (R. 88). 
Add. C. 
At sentencing, the parties had not yet reached agreement on the issue of defendant's 
claimed set off amount, and the prosecutor requested a restitution hearing (R. 90: 5). Add. 
D. With that in mind, together with the information contained in the presentence report and 
with the knowledge that negotiations had been occurring, the sentencing judge entered a 
restitution order for the maximum amount misappropriated by defendant, and granted the 
restitution hearing in a manner which provided incentive for the parties to continue 
negotiations: 
I am of the view at this stage that the restitution sum will be as I've 
indicated unless I modify it and that leaves open the potential for negotiation 
between your lawyer and those at the State who do have knowledge about 
what their records reflect. If there is no satisfactory conclusion by either party, 
then you're to notify this Court, [defense counsel], and I will set the matter for 
an evidentiary hearing.... At which time, all of the claims will be inquired 
into and a determination will be made; but until and unless that occurs, the 
number is now specified. 
(R. 90: 7). Add. D. Neither party objected to this decision, both apparently satisfied that 
they could continue with the negotiations in which they had previously been engaged. 
Five months later, defense counsel moved to withdraw "based on the fact that all legal 
services for which Counsel was retained have been completed and resolved" (R. 52). Add. 
E. The court granted the motion three days after it was filed (R. 54). The next entry in the 
record is the appearance two months later of new defense counsel who immediately "requests 
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a Restitution Hearing" on behalf of defendant and seeks "documentation as to how the 
Restitution amount of $131,541.13 was calculated" (R. 55). Add. E. The trial court 
ultimately denied defendant's motion (R. 69). Add. G. 
It is in the context of this set of circumstances that defendant makes his appellate 
claim that he was not granted the restitution hearing to which he was statutorily entitled. 
Aplt. Br. at 11-16. The problem lies with the absence of record support for the claim that 
defendant was entitled to a restitution hearing when he filed his written request for one. Id. 
at 8,11, 15. The order at sentencing granted a restitution hearing only if one was necessary. 
Clearly, if post-sentencing negotiations were successful, no restitution hearing would be held 
as none would be necessary. In other words, defendant would not have been entitled to a 
restitution hearing, and his request for one would have been properly denied. 
Defendant claims numerous times on appeal that negotiations occurred following 
entry of the sentencing order but failed to produce a satisfactory result: "[t]he parties never 
reached an agreement as to the amount of restitution"; "the parties had been unable to 
determine a mutually acceptable restitution figure"; "negotiations failed"; "at the trial court's 
instruction, Mr. Pearson initially attempted to resolve the matter through negotiations"; 
defendant renewed his request for a restitution hearing "when it was clear that negotiations 
between Mr. Pearson and the State were not going to produce a mutually amicable result;" 
"Mr. Pearson waited several months in attempts to reach an agreement with the state". Aplt. 
13 
Br. at 8, 11,15. None of these statements include a citation to the record, however, because 
there is no record support for them. 
Defendant bears the burden of providing record support for his appellate claims. See 
State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). He has failed to meet that burden here. 
Defendant never made that claim below. His motion and his argument at the hearing on his 
motion are devoid of any mention of the negotiations or their outcome. He never reminded 
the trial court of the sentencing ruling which provided for the grant of a restitution hearing 
of negotiations were unsuccessful. He never explained why his motion was not filed until 
seven months after sentencing. He did not argue below that prior counsel failed to follow 
through with, or otherwise act upon, the negotiation requirement in the sentencing order and 
makes no claim to this Court of ineffective assistance of prior counsel. Instead, the argument 
appears for the first time on appeal that the negotiations occurred, they failed, and defendant 
was entitled to the hearing "promised" by the sentencing judge. 
Where a defendant fails to provide the requisite record support for his appellate claim, 
this Court should reject his argument and assume the regularity of the trial court proceedings. 
See Miller, 718 P.2d 405. Here, this Court should reject defendant's unsupported claim that 
the negotiations failed and, hence, provided a basis for his untimely motion for a restitution 
hearing. 
The record supports both the existence and the success of the negotiations. The 
parties had actively negotiated the issue up until sentencing. No one objected to the trial 
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court's suggestion of continued negotiation post-sentencing. No one informed the trial court 
at any time thereafter that negotiations had occurred or that they had reached "no satisfactory 
conclusion^]" as required by the court's order before a restitution hearing would be 
scheduled (R. 90: 7). Instead, the record is silent for five months, after which defendant's 
first counsel withdraws, claiming that "all legal services for which Counsel was retained 
have been completed and resolved" (R. 52). Add. E. The same counsel never sought a 
restitution hearing following sentencing, strongly suggesting that none was necessary due to 
the outcome of the negotiations. Defendant did not object to or otherwise contradict the 
reasoning set forth in his counsel's motion to withdraw. 
The reasonable interpretation of these facts is that negotiations occurred and were 
satisfactorily completed before defense counsel withdrew. Satisfactory negotiations defeat 
defendant's ability to obtain a restitution hearing (R. 90: 7). Because defendant's claim of 
a right to a restitution hearing rests on a unilateral allegation of failed negotiations which 
enjoys no record support, his claim should be deemed waived and the denial of his motion 
below affirmed. See State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289,293 (Utah 1982) (the appellate court 
"cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported 
by the record"). 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CONTEST BOTH THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE STATUTORY 
RESTITUTION FACTORS AS WELL AS THE RECORDING OF 
REASONING BEHIND THE RESTITUTION AMOUNT 
Defendant argues that the district court failed to follow the statutory mandates in 
imposing restitution. Aplt. Br. at 17-22. Specifically, he argues that the trial judge did "not 
consider [] any of the relevant factors" outlined in section 77-3 8a-3 02(5) before setting the 
restitution figure at the sentencing hearing. Aplt. Br. at 18, 20. He also contends that the 
trial judge failed to make "the reasons for its decision part of the record" as required by 
section 77-38a-302(3). Aplt. Br. at 17-18. These failures, he argues, prevent him from 
challenging the findings underlying the court's decision and warrant a remand for a foil 
restitution hearing. Id. at 21-22. 
This Court need not reach defendant's arguments because defendant waived these 
claims by failing to assert them below. SeeStatev. FFeefe,2002UT98,1f22,61 P.3d 1000. 
In any event, the record reveals that the trial court properly considered the relevant factors 
and expressly noted the reasoning for his decision on the record. 
A. Few of the Statutory Factors are Relevant 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b) provides: 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
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(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in 
damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the 
offense; 
(ii) t he cost of necessary medical and related professional 
services and devices relating to physical or mental health care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance 
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of 
treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages 
that are lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment 
items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were 
essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the 
offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the 
offense resulted in the death of a victim. 
Subsection (5)(c) provides: 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and 
(b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other 
obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an 
installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
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(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make 
restitution appropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c). 
The factors listed in subsection (b) are largely irrelevant to this case, with the 
exception of subsection (i) which involves damage or loss to the victim. The factors in 
subsection (c) generally apply here. However, the lists contained in the statute are not all 
inclusive, and the trial court is permitted to consider all relevant facts, even those not listed 
in the statute, in making an appropriate restitution decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-
302(5)(b) (". . . the court shall consider all relevant facts . . . ") (emphasis added). 
B. Preservation 
"'[A]s a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal.'" State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, \ 27, 72 P.3d 692 (quoting State v. Cram, 2002 
UT 37, \ 9, 46 P.3d 230) (additional quotation omitted), cert, denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 
2003). To preserve a claim for appellate review, the defendant must make "'a 
contemporaneous objection5" or offer "'some form of specific preservation of claims of 
error'" on the trial court record. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App.1993) 
(quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,551 (Utah 1987)); see also State v. Finder, 2005 UT 
15,145,114 P.3d 551; State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989); Smith, 2003 UT 
App 179,1|27. 
Defendant had multiple opportunities to alert the court to his concerns, not only at the 
sentencing hearing, but before sentencing when he was negotiating restitution with the State, 
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when he filed his motion requesting a restitution hearing, when he appeared for the motion 
hearing before the sentencing judge, and when the judge entered his final written order. 
Defendant, however, stated no objection on either basis before or during sentencing, 
remained silent for seven months thereafter, and at the November hearing opted to contest 
the amount of the restitution order without mentioning the statutory mandates he now 
contends were ignored (R. 92: 3-4). He similarly remained silent after the court issued its 
written order denying a restitution hearing, again foregoing an opportunity to alert the trial 
court to his concerns regarding the statutory factors and the reasoning upon which the 
restitution order was based. Defendant's failure at each opportunity to alert the trial court 
about his concerns prevented the court from addressing either issue below. Defendant has, 
therefore, waived his right to appellate review of his arguments. See Weeks, 2002 UT 98, f^ 
22 (defendant's failure at the restitution hearing to object to the court's alleged failure to 
reference the statutory factors on the record waived any appellate challenge on that issue); 
Cram, 2002 UT 37, f^ 9 ("'[T]he doctrine of waiver has application if [a] defendant[] fail[s] 
to raise claims at the appropriate time at the trial level, so the judge has an opportunity to rule 
on the issue.'"); Smith, 2003 UT App 179427 (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781,783-
84 (Utah 1992)) (additional quotation omitted). Cf James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 574 
(Utah App. 1998) (noting that any error in considering restitution factors should have been 
brought to the immediate attention of the sentencing judge), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999). 
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Recognizing that he made no specific objections below, defendant claims that 
objections concerning the amount and determination of restitution were raised by the trial 
court sua sponte at sentencing, thereby relieving defendant of his burden. Aplt. Br. at 22-23. 
He claims that the trial court not only sua sponte raised the issue "that it needed to make the 
reasons for its restitution decision part of the record55 but "indicated it would do so during the 
restitution hearing.55 Id. at 23, 24. The trial court's comments at sentencing do not 
reasonably lend themselves to this interpretation. 
The trial judge recognized "the potential for negotiation55 that existed between the 
parties and explained that should such negotiations occur without a "satisfactory conclusion,55 
the parties could return to the court (R. 90: 7). This did nothing, however, to preserve 
defendant's specific claims relating to statutory mandates. The trial court ordered a specific 
amount of restitution at sentencing and expressly noted that "the number is now specified55 
and that "the restitution sum will be as Fve indicated55 (id.). He made it clear that, barring 
any further action of the court, the order was final (id.). Hence, absent a proper request to 
revisit the issue, the trial court reasonably anticipated that the restitution issue was decided 
and its order was complete and final. On this record, no such request occurred, leaving the 
restitution order intact. See Point I, supra. 
In any event, nothing in his ruling suggests that the judge believed the order was not 
a statutorily-compliant final order of restitution. His subsequent reaffirmation of the 
restitution order expressly noted what the record at the sentencing hearing had already made 
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clear: the judge relied on the presentence report and the information it contained (R. 69-70). 
Hence, the trial court did not, sua sponte, recognize any concern for either his reasoning or 
his consideration of statutory factors. Defendant was not relieved of his duty to make the 
necessary specific and timely objection to preserve his appellate claims, and his failure to do 
so prevents appellate review of his claims. 
C. Plain Error 
Defendant asserts alternatively that plain error excuses his failure to preserve his 
claims for appellate review. Aplt. Br. at 23-24. However, the record refutes defendant's 
assertion. 
To establish plain error, defendant must first establish that an error exists that 1) 
should have been obvious to the trial court, and 2) was of sufficient magnitude that it affected 
his substantial rights—i.e., prejudiced him. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 
1996); Brown, 856 P.2d at 363. 
Defendant argues that the claimed error was obvious because the trial court was aware 
of the statutory mandates to consider the relevant factors and to include in the record the 
reasoning for the restitution decision. Yet, defendant contends, the trial court failed to detail 
on the record "the reason as to how it determined" the restitution amount.3 Aplt. Br. at 24. 
The harm, he claims, arose because the court's failure to state those reasons made it 
"impossible for the defendant to contest the amount." Id. 
3To the extent defendant argues that the court was required to givev a detailed 
financial accounting of its restitution decision, he cites no authority for that proposition. 
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Defendant's claims both fail because the court in fact put on the record the basis for 
its restitution determination. Subsection 3 02(5)(b) requires only that "the court shall consider 
all relevant facts" in formulating a restitution award, including, but not limited to, the factors 
listed in the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b). Subsection 302(3) provides that 
"the court shall make the reasons for the [restitution] decision part of the court record." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(3). These sections do not require "that a sentencing court make a 
record setting forth its reasoning as to each of the factors in its restitution order, only that it 
consider each factor and make a record setting forth the reasons for its decision." Weeks, 
2002 UT 98,1fl| 23,25, n. 11 (emphasis in original); see, e.g., State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 
1299 (Utah 1993) (so long as the judge was familiar with defendant's background prior to 
imposing the sentence, the law does not require the judge to list or discuss either the 
aggravating and mitigating factors or the reasons for imposing an indeterminate-term 
sentence). 
Where "it is reasonable to do so[,]" this Court may "assume that the trial court 
considered all of the factors set forth in Utah Code Annotated section [77-38a-302(3).]" 
Smith, 2003 UT App 179, f 30 n.9 (citing Weeks, 2002 UT 98, f 24). Such an assumption 
is not warranted in situations "where (1) an ambiguity of facts makes the assumption 
unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly provides that written findings must be made, or (3) a 
prior case states that findings on an issue must be made." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^J11, 
40 P.3d 626 (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997)) (additional 
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citations omitted). Detailed findings of fact are not required in this situation. See Weeks, 
2002 UT 98, ffif 23-24; see also Smith, 2003 UT App 179, \ 29,72 P.3d 692; State v. Haston, 
811 P.2d 929, 937 (Utah App. 1991) (formal findings of fact are not necessary under the 
statute), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). Neither are the facts 
ambiguous, as established in the presentence investigation report and defendant's expressed 
agreement with its thoughtflilness and accuracy (R. 88; R. 90: 3). 
In this case, the basis for the trial court's restitution order was obvious: the 
presentence investigation report. It was the only evidence before the district court that 
reflected the total amount of misappropriated funds. Far from generating an "arbitrary" 
figure, as defendant claims, the report detailed how the misappropriations occurred and 
presented the figure as "the aggregate of misappropriated disbursements from the DABC 
petty cash account at Bank Once, recycling incentive money, which was never deposited into 
an official DABC account, and DABC money used to pay for Sparta United Soccer clothing 
and equipment" (R. 88: 2-5). It contained specific information concerning defendant's 
shuffling of funds from and between various accounts, defendant's failure to document many 
of the transactions, defendant's claims of set-offs, and the State Auditor's determination of 
documented and undocumented disbursements. 
In addition, the report contained information relating to the factors listed in section 
77-3 8a-302(5)(c), including defendant's "stable life," "substantial incoming retirement," and 
detailed household income and financial obligation information which permitted the report 
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to ultimately recommend that "he immediately begin making restitution while incarcerated" 
(R. 88: 3, 6-7). 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court judge noted that he had "received and 
reviewed" the report (R. 90: 2-3). He then heard the argument of both parties, including 
defendant's praise of the report's content and thoughtfiilness, and both parties' agreement 
with the recommendations of AP&P in the report (R. 90: 3-5). The prosecutor noted some 
specific amounts that defendant used for his personal benefit, and the judge sought 
clarification of how those amounts related to the information in the presentence report (R. 
90: 5). The judge thereafter ordered restitution in the same amount identified in the report 
as the total amount of misappropriated funds (R. 88: 2, 3, 5; R. 90: 6). No other source of 
information provided that figure to the court. The lack of elaboration in the order does not 
prevent the reasonable assumption that the sentencing judge considered the information and 
reasoning of the report. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ j 12. 
The court's subsequent written order renders the judge's reliance on the report 
indisputable: 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4), Defendant's request is 
untimely as the motion was not made, nor any objection voiced, until seven 
months after the sentencing. Moreover, the presentence report in this case 
provides an accurate outline of the amounts misused and their destinations, 
and defendant had access to this report and the discovery which detailed the 
State's accounting. Finally, in State v. Weeks, 2002 UT98, 61 P.3d 1000, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that restitution based upon the information in a 
presentence report is a sufficient basis upon which the Court may determine 
an order of restitution. 
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(R. 69) (emphasis added). 
Nowhere in the record does the sentencing judge make any exception as to the 
credibility of the contents of the presentence report, and defendant establishes none. The 
circumstances surrounding the restitution order in this case permit the reasonable assumption 
that the sentencing judge adopted not only the "accurate outline" of the calculations in the 
presentence report, but the remainder of the report's reasoning as to the factors relevant to 
subsection 302(5)(c) as well. See Smith, 2003 UT App 179, \ 30; see also Weeks, 2002 UT 
98, f If 24,25, n. 11 (acknowledging that appellate court may assume that the sentencing court 
considered the statutory factors, and disavowing any requirement that the sentencing court 
list every statutory factor when rendering its restitution decision). 
Accordingly, the reasoning behind the restitution order is apparent on the record, 
including consideration of the relevant statutory factors, and defendant's claim of plain 
error—entirely based on the trial court's alleged failure to state the reasons for its restitution 
( 
award—fails. See Weeks, 2002 UT 98, \ 25 (refusing to reach an alleged error in the 
sentencing court's restitution order where defendant failed to raise the claim below or to 
establish plain error on appeal).4 
4Even if this Court were to determine that the trial court failed to adequately set 
forth in the record the reasoning for its restitution decision, the remedy would not be the 
restitution hearing defendant seeks. Aplt. Br. at 21-22, 25. Instead, the matter should be 
remanded to the trial court with an order for the judge to comply with the statute by 
giving "an explanation of its decision which demonstrates that it has taken into account 
the appropriate statutory factors.'" Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, \ 17 n.8 (quoting Monson 
v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1028 (Utah 1996)). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a restitution hearing. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). 
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3X^_ day of July, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 . Theft—Elements 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-404. 
§ 7 6 - 8 - 4 0 2 . Misusing public monies 
(1) Every public officer of this state or a political subdivision, or of any 
county, city, town, precinct, or district of this state, and every other person 
charged, either by law or under contract, with the receipt, safekeeping, trans-
fer, disbursement, or use of public monies commits an offense if the officer or 
other charged person: 
(a) appropriates the money or any portion of it to his own use or benefit or 
to the use or benefit of another without authority of law; 
(b) loans or transfers the money or any portion of it without authority of 
law; 
(c) fails to keep the money in his possession until disbursed or paid out by 
authority of law; 
(d) unlawfully deposits the money or any portion in any bank or with any 
other person; 
(e) knowingly keeps any false account or makes any false entry or erasure 
in any account of or relating to the money; 
(f) fraudulently alters, falsifies, conceals, destroys, or obliterates any such 
account; 
(g) willfully refusesjpr omits to pay over, on demand, any public monies in 
his hands, upon the presentation of a draft, order, or warrant drawn upon 
such monies by competent authority; 
(h) willfully omits to transfer the money when the transfer is required by 
law; or 
(i) willfully omits or refuses to pay over, to any officer or person authorized 
by law to receive it, any money received by him under any duty imposed by 
law so to pay over the same. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1) is a felony of the third degree, except it is a 
felony of the second degree if: 
(a) the value of the money exceeds $5,000; 
(b) the amount of the false account exceeds $5,000; 
(c) the amount falsely entered exceeds $5,000; 
(d) the amount that is the difference between the original amount and the 
fraudulently altered amount exceeds $5,000; or 
(e) the amount falsely erased, fraudulently concealed, destroyed, obliterat-
ed, or falsified in the account exceeds $5,000. 
(3) In addition to the penalty described in Subsection (2), a public officer 
who violates Subsection (1) is subject to the penalties described in Section 
76-8-404. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-8-402; Laws 1995, c. 232, § 6, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1999, c. 
106, § 22, eff. July 1, 1999. 
§ 76-10—1801. Communications fraud—Elements—Penalties 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or 
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than 
$5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall 
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud. 
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk 
over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and 
written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made 
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Laws 1985, c. 157, § 2; Laws 1990, c. 79, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 24, eff. May 1, 
1995. 
Addendum B 
§ 7 7 - 3 8 a - 3 0 2 . Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided 
in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(13) and in determining 
whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and 
procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution 
and court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a 
victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having 
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal 
sentence at the time"of sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined 
as provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate 
under this part, the court shall make the reasons for die decision part of the 
court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing 
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an 
offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of 
criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's 
criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or 
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical 
care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing 
recognized by the law of the place of treatment; ** 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are 
lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that 
were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current 
employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections 
(5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment 
of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the 
defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis 
or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitu-
tion and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order 
of restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation 
of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution 
under this Subsection (5), substantially outweighs the need to provide restitu-
tion to the victim. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eff. May 6, 2002; 
Laws 2002, c. 185, § 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
Addendum C 
PRIVATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
Region III - Salt Lake City 
36 W. Fremont Ave 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Phone: (801) 239-2244 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Date Due: 02/17/04 
Sentencing Date: 02/20/04 
Judge Frederick, Third District Court 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah 
(City) (County) 
Peg Stewart, INVESTIGATOR 
Name: PEARSON, Richard Warren 
Aliases: none 
Address: 11 Mountainwood Lane 
Sandy, Utah 
Birthdate: 03/28/41 Age: 62 
Offender Number: 160339 
DAO#: 03020136 
Prosecuting Attorney: Anne Cameron 
Defense Attorney: Thomas Rassmussen 
Marital Status: married 
Court Case No. Offense Plea 
031906848 3 cts. Misuse of Public Money, a Second Degree Guilty 
Felony 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony Guilty 






It is respectfully recommended by Adult Probation and Parole, Court Services Unit, the 
defendant be granted the privilege of 36 months supervised probation with the following special 
conditions: 
1) Serve 150 days in jail; 
2) Complete cognitive restructuring classes; 
3) Pay restitution as determined by the District Attorney's Office; 
4) May not be employed in a position of financial responsibility; and 




EVALUATIVE ASSESSMENT AND PROBLEM AREAS: 
The defendant was interviewed at the office of Adult Probation and Parole. He was cooperative, 
but he appeared to minimiz&Jhis offense and place much of the blame on his superiors. The 
defendant was difficult to interview when discussing the principle behind his actions, as he 
continued to give examples of other employee's behaviors or particular transactions. He 
verbalized he was sorry about his actions, but always included others as liable. He stated he 
gained no benefit from his manipulation of agency accounts, and he acted on behalf of his fellow 
employees. He indicated he was told by his superiors to find a way to obtain financing for an 
employee gym. He admitted he broke the law when he opened an account with his social security 
number, but again he did it for the employees. The defendant also indicated he felt obliged to 
continue his transactions, as he "saw how Ken (his director) treated other people," and he knows 
how he acts "if he doesn't get his way." He indicated his superiors "left him out to dry," as there 
are others in the office who were just as culpable. 
He scored on the Level of Service Inventory as low risk to reoffend, and there are no issues of 
concern other than the number of his current convictions. The defendant's Criminal History 
Matrix indicated he receive regular probation 
This offense involved the defendant misappropriating incoming and outgoing financial 
transactions of $131,000 while he acted as General Accountant for the Department of Alcohol 
and Beverage ComirrtssT0n over a three year period. He has been an accountant for 30 years, and 
he manipulated the finances without the knowledge of his superiors. 
Regarding this offense, the defendant stated, "I'm sorry. I was wrong, just trying to help the 
employees. I didn't benefit. It was the environment of the office. I truly regret it happened." He 
indicated he has himself been in positions of authority and law enforcement in the military. The 
defendant was challenged he may have benefited in other ways besides financial He stated, 
"Maybe it was my ego. I don't know. It made me feel better helping people. I have always tried 
to help people out." Regarding payment of restitution the defendant stated he was willing to pay 
restitution in addition to others who may be culpable. 
The defendant has no criminal history; he served for many years in the military including a tour 
of duty in the Vietnam War; he is highly regarded by numerous friends and business colleagues 
as a caring, giving individual; his previous DABC Director Ken Wynn believes jail time is not 
necessary and he gave a favorable recommendation; he maintained a long term career and stable 
residence for his family. 




superiors. He admitted he was wrong, but explained he was only a few years from retiring, he 
saw the inappropriate activity in the office and became desensitized. According to the State 
Investigator in this case, the defendant was found to have misused monies over a three-year 
period; and had they investigated the time prior to this, he believes they would have discovered 
further misappropriations. The prosecutor indicated these charges were only a representation of 
the offenses he committed. The defendant denied any financial benefit from his misuse, as it was 
for his fellow employees benefit, but the investigator reported the defendant admitted to him he 
purchased personal items with the money, and there is a portion of the misused money still 
unaccounted for. 
The defendant misused $131,000, of which $25,000 he used to supply his soccer association with 
uniforms, and of which a portion remains unaccounted for. He appears to have misused some of 
this money to benefit his fellow employees by providing a gym with equipment, and provide his 
superiors with other requested items, but it also appears he benefited perhaps through employee's 
and his soccer club's accolades; and though he denied this, he benefited monetarily himself. He 
appears to have purposely failed to keep documentation of all his transactions because he had 
something to hide. 
This agency believes it appropriate the defendant should serve jail time for his actions and then 
address his thinking errors to help him come to terms and admit his wrongs with sincerity. He is 
an excellent candidate for probation as he has a stable life with substantial incoming retirement, 
and has no substance abuse issues. As his household income equals approximately $14,000 per 
month, it is recommended he immediately begin making restitution while incarcerated. This 
agency believes it appropriate the defendant serve 30 days jail for each of his five counts. 
OFFENSE: 
Plea Agreement: 
The defendant was originally charged with Counts I, III and V: Misuse Public Money, a Second 
Degree Felony; Count II: Theft, a Second Degree Felon; and Count IV: Communications Fraud, 
a Second Degree Felony. He pled guilty as charged. 
Factual Summary of Offense: 
The following information was taken from the detailed probable cause statement: 
On March 13, 2003, Agent Doug Townsend, State Bureau of Investigation, began investigating a 
confidential report that someone at the State's Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 
(DABC) was authorizing payment of DABC funds to pay for embroidery for Sparta United 
Soccer uniforms and equipment. The complainant specifically named the defendant as the 
individual authorizing payments. 




Up to and including May 23, 2003, the defendant was the General Accountant for the DABC and 
was responsible for making payments and accountings of the public monies used to operate 
DABC. The official DABC operating account and petty cash account are held at Bank One, and 
were used by the defendant for both legitimate and illegitimate financial activities with DABC 
funds. 
At some time prior to October 15,1999, the defendant opened an unofficial, unauthorized DABC 
account at Beehive Credit Union, where he had his personal account and an account for Sparta 
United Soccer. The defendant opened the account at Beehive by naming himself as trustee for the 
DABC Candy Account, and by using his personal tax identification number or social security 
number. The defendant claimed the "candy account" was set up specifically to fund an employee 
gym at DABC, to purchase candy for machines located in D ABC's office and to provide an 
unofficial employee Christmas fund. According to the defendant, proceeds from the candy 
machines were to be placed in the Beehive "candy account" and then were to be used to purchase 
candy to be sold from the machines, to purchase fitness equipment, and to fund Christmas 
incentives and gift certificates for DABC employees. 
On April 4, 2003, Agent Townsend met with Joe Christensen, Debbie Empey, and Leslie Larsen 
at the Utah State Auditor's Office to advise them of the investigation. Christensen indicated a 
hard audit of the DABC books had not be done for approximately three years, and the State 
Auditor's Office would examine DABC accounts more thoroughly and reconcile bank statements 
for the years between 1999 and 2002. Julie Rigby, CPA at the Utah State Auditor's Office 
reconciled the statements and the DABC accounting of the official DABC operating and petty 
cash accounts held at Bank One, as well as the defendant's candy account, his personal account, 
and his Sparta Gold soccer account, all held at Beehive Credit Union. As a result, the defendant's 
gross mishandling of public monies was discovered and investigated. 
Based upon the investigation of Agent Townsend and the State Auditor's Office, it was apparent 
the defendant advanced monies to an employee from the petty cash account held at Bank One, 
and then deposited the repayment of those monies into his personal accounts held at Beehive 
Credit Union. The defendant also had many disbursements from the petty cash account that he 
either deposited directly into his Beehive Credit Union Accounts, used to pay his personal 
Costco bill, or purchased gift certificates for employee incentives. 
It was also discovered that the State participates in a recycle incentive program for cardboard 
boxes used for merchandise at State Liquor Stores. The money that was sent to DABC in return 
for the recycling was usurped by the defendant and placed into his accounts at Beehive Credit 
Union as well the Sparta Soccer Account to which he had access. 
On March 4, 2003, Ken Wynn, Director of the DABC, confronted the defendant about the 




funds, authorized by the defendant. The defendant indicated to Wynn that Sparta United Soccer 
had reimbursed the DABC for all of the expenditures he had authorized the DABC to make on 
their behalf. That amount, according to the defendant was $25,777.22. The audit conducted by 
the State shows that Sparta United Soccer did issue payment to the DABC for the $25,777.22, 
but the defendant deposited $6,755.32 of that (two checks) directly into a Beehive Credit Union 
account, and that the rest of the money paid by Sparta to the DABC was deposited into the Bank 
One petty cash account and then redistributed by the defendant without any documentation. 
The defendant made the following disbursements between 1999 and 2002, from the Bank One 
DABC petty cash account without documentation: $1,040.00 deposited to the Beehive Credit 
Union Candy account; $3,139.00 to Bank One, cashed; $6,550.00 to Cash; $9,390.00 as 
paycheck advance to a DABC employee; $4,512.50 to Harmons for gift certificates for employee 
Christmas bonuses; $6,160.00 to HRS/Costco, defendant's personal account; $5,350.00 to 
DABC; $18,107.66, a single disbursement, payable to Richard Pearson; and the defendant 
received $12,020.00 in cash back from deposits, including the deposits from the Sparta United 
checks. 
In addition to the above referenced disbursements, the defendant manipulated DABC operating 
and petty cash accounts, he used DABC funds to pay for the Sparta United Soccer uniforms and 
equipment in addition to opening the "DABC Candy Account," naming himself as trustee, using 
his own tax identification/social security number. Furthermore, the defendant disbursed money 
from the DABC petty cash account and the recycling incentive program to the Candy Account, 
his personal account, and the Sparta Soccer account and he advanced money to an employee 
from the petty cash account and then depositing that employee's paychecks into the Candy 
Account at Beehive Credit Union. The defendant disbursed DABC funds to himself, without any 
documentation or written authority. 
The approximate amount of DABC money misappropriated by the defendant is^431,541.13.| 
This amount is the aggregate of misappropriated disbursements from the DABC petty casE 
account at Bank One, recycling incentive money, which was never deposited into an official 
DABC account, and DABC money used to pay for Sparta United Soccer clothing and equipment. 
Defendant Statement: 
Please see attached statement. 
Comments: 
The defendant's statement is lengthy, but the defendant indicated his full version of this case was 
described in the document. In reviewing this, the fifteen pages include numerous examples and 
descriptions of transactions, the demands of his superiors, and the behavior of individuals whom 





The defendant was booked and released on October 14, 2003, and he spent zero days in jail. 
CRIMINAL HISTORY: 
The defendant has no known criminal history other than the present offense. 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT AND RESTITUTION: 
Contact was made with the Director of DABC, Ken Wynn, who stated he worked with the 
defendant for 25 years, and he found him to be a good friend and a good person. He was 
surprised by this incident. He indicated the defendant has a big heart, and he felt he did this to 
help other people and with no malice. Mr. Wynn stated he would hate to see the defendant go to 
jail. He felt he made a stupid mistake, but he still considers him a friend. 
Phone contact was made with State Auditor Julie Wrigley, who performed the audit in this 
case. She indicated the defendant submitted his own documentation to account for $36,000, in 
addition to a list from Harmon's documenting employee certificates purchased. Ms Wrigley 
reported it appears a good portion of the misused money was spent legitimately, but there is still 
a portion unaccounted for, and the defendant kept no documentation of his transactions. During 
the investigation, the defendant reported he was owed the money and he paid himself back, but 
as he kept no documentation he was unable to articulate how he was able to track the amount. 
Restitution will be determined by the District Attorney's office. 
DEFENDANT'S LIFE HISTORY AND CURRENT LIVING SITUATION: 
The defendant was born in Sioux City, Iowa to Ann and John Pearson in 1941. He reported he 
had a happy normal childhood, with no major problems though his parents divorced and 
remarried. He was raised in a middle-income environment. He completed high school and then 
graduated from Coe College as a 2nd Lieutenant. He served in the Air Force until 1975, and then 
he obtained an Accounting Degree at Weber State College. 
The defendant has lived in Utah since 1969, after a tour of duty in Vietnam. He has been married 
for 30 years to Dora and they have a 16-year old son, Trevor. They have lived in the same home 
since 1986. He retired from the reserves in 1991, and he collects retirement from the DABC and 
the military. He currently has a good relationship with his mother, who resides in Iowa, though 
she is unaware of this case. His father and stepfather are deceased, as is his only brother. He has 
no contact with his stepsiblings. He enjoys a relationship with his wife's family., and he 




During the past six years he has been involved in the Sparta Soccer Club. Last year he coached 
his niece's soccer team, and he was also involved with his son's soccer team. The defendant 
indicated his wife and son are very concerned about this case, but they are supportive. His wife 
works for the IRS, and he stated this is also a concern for her. 
EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION: 
The defendant graduated from high school in 1959, and he obtained a BA in Political Science, 
and a BS in Accounting. He served in the Air Force from 1963 to 1975, and he was employed 
with the DABC from December 1976 to January 2003, when he retired. He now collects monthly 
retirement of $3,097 from DABC; $2,395 from the military; $1,359 from social security; and 
$867 from social security for his son, until he is age 18; and his wife earns $75,000 per year. His 
household income totals approximately $14,000 per month. 
He reported the following financial obligations: 
Wells Fargo, mortgage 
























Wells Fargo Mastercard 






























SUBSTANCE ABUSE HISTORY/MENTAL HEALTH: 
The defendant reported he has one or two drinks three times per week, and he has never used 
illicit drugs. He has no substance abuse concerns. 
The defendant described his physical health as good. He has high blood pressure, but he controls 
this with medication. He described his emotional health as "fine." He is experiencing a "little 
stress," but he indicated his wife and son are more stressed. He has no mental health concerns, 
nor has he in the past. 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: 
Phone contact was made with State Bureau Investigator Doug Townsend. He stated the 
defendant embezzled $131,000 and the defendant claimed he could account for most of it; but he 
was spending it, living on it and spending it on his wife. He believed the defendant diverted 
money to Sparta Soccer League more than what was found. The defendant provided copies of 
checks totaling several thousand dollars, but he diverted this mto his own account. Investigator 
Townsend believes the defendant did benefit financially from his actions by commingling funds 
by moving money back and forth from the petty cash account to his own account. He was 
spending money for his own personal items, including cartons of cigarettes for his wife and other 
items from Costco. He reported the defendant admitted to him he purchased cigarettes, DVDs 
and other personal items. He also found there were many avenues the defendant embezzled 
money, but they picked only three years of impropriety to focus on. He believes the defendant's 
misusage went beyond three years. He believes the defendant has a few dishonest bones in his 
body, and had they gone back before 1999 they would have found more. 
Investigator Townsend was asked about his sentencing recommendation. He stated the defendant 
has paid somewhat of a price by being forced to retire and have his name smeared in the press; 
and he will never be employed as an accountant again. He believes the defendant should do some 
jail time, as he was convicted of five 2nd degree felonies, and pay restitution. He is not sure 
prison would serve its purpose. 
Phone contact was made with prosecutor Anne Cameron. She stated the defendant still refuses 
to accept responsibility or see that he did anything wrong. The office climate may have been bad, 
but he was in a position to say no. She will reserve her recommendation for the day of 
sentencing. 
A message was left with the defendant's attorney Thomas Rasmussen, but a return call was not 




Phone contact was made with the defendant's wife, Dora Pearson. She stated she has been 
married to the defendant for 31 years. They have a strong marriage and the defendant is the 
strength of their marriage. She still cannot believe this has happened. She knows they did not 
receive anything monetarily from his actions. She stated this was so out of character for her 
husband, as he has always been more of a giver than a taker. She stated if they were out to a 
restaurant and he was under charged, he would point this out, and that is the kind of person he is. 
She believes he would have had to be under a lot of pressure to act this way. She is very stressed 
about this case as the defendant is trying to protect her by not sharing all the information. She 
believes he may have been left out to dry and other employees might be afraid to step forward. 
She believes there had to be others in the office who knew of his activities. Their son is very 
worried about him, as they have a very close relationship. 
Attached are numerous letters of support from the defendant's friends and family. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Peg Stewart, Investigator 
Approved: 
Gerald R. White, Supervisor 
Court Services Unit 
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT 
These arc guidelines only They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the offender. 
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS 0 NONE VIOLENCE HISTORY 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL 2 ONE (PRIOR JUVENILE OR ADULT CONVICTION 
CONVICTIONS) 4 TWO FOR AN OFFENSE WHICH INCLUDES USE OF A 
6 THREE WEAPON PHYSICAL FORCE, THREAT OF 
8 MORE THAN THREE FORCE. OR SEXUAL ABUSE) 
PRIOR MISDEMEANOR 0 NONE 
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(EXCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC) 4 MORE THAN SEVEN 
WEAPONS USE IN CURRENT OFFENSE 
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MORETHAN FOUR 
SECURE PLACEMENT 
TOTAL PLACEMENT SCORE: 0 
NO PRIOR SUPERVISION 
PRIOR SUPERVISION 
PRIOR RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 
PRIOR REVOCATION 
ACT OCCURRED WHILE UNDER CURRENT SUPERIVSION OR 
PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 
NO ESCAPES OR ABSCONDINGS 
FAILURE TO REPORT (ACTIVE OFFENSE) OR OUTSTANDING 
WARRANT 
ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION 
ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM 
ESCAPED FROM CONFINEMENT 
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C O N S E C U T I V E E N H A N C E M E N T S : 40 % of the short* r sentence is to be added to the full length of the longer sentence. 
C O N C U R R E N T E N H A N C E M E N T S : 10 % of the shorter sentence is to be added to the full length of the longer sentence. 
Matrix timeframes refer to imprisonment only. Refer to the categorization of offenses. 
Capital offenses are not considered within the context of the sentencing guidelines. 
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MOST SERIOUS 
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AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
(Use Form 3 also for Mandatory Imprisonment Sex Offender Sentences) 
Circle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the guidelines. Reference the page number of the Presentence 
investigation where the judge can find supportive information. 
This list of aggravating and mitigating factors is non-exhaustive and illustrative only. 
Aggravating Circumstances 
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not an element of the offense. 
PS1 Page# 
1. Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct. 
2. Multiple documented incidents of violence not resulting in conviction. (Requires court 
approved stipulation) 
3. Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior. 
4. Victim was particularly vulnerable. 
5. Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive. 
6. Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity. 
7. There were multiple charges or victims. 
8. Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting. 
9. Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest 
10. Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify as an high risk 
offender. 
11. Offender was in position of authority over victim(s). 
12. Other (specify) 
Mitigating Circumstances 
1. Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm. 
2. Offender acted under strong provocation. 
3. There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal behavior, though failing to 
establish a defense. 
4. Offender is young. 
5. Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other crimes. 
6. Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration. 
7. Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision. 
8. Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family relationships. 
9. Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or dependents. 
10. Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time. 
11. Offender was less active participant in the crime. 
12. All offenses were from a single criminal episode. 
13. Offender has completed or has nearly completed payment of restitution. 
14. Other (specify) 
PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SECTION 
DAYS OF JAIL CREDIT: 0 days 
GUIDELINE MATRIX RECOMMENDATION: probation 
AP&P RECOMMENDATIONS: probation 
REASON FOR DEPARTURE: N/A 





When the Department moved into the new building, I was in meetings with 
Dennis Kellen and Ken Wynn. During these meetings it was decided to have a physical 
fitness facility for the employees. I was assigned the project. At the time, Gordon 
Crabtree was the Director of Finance. Gordon advised that only departments with police 
or firefighters were authorized to have fitness facilities paid for by the State. I apprised 
Dennis and Ken of this information. There was still interest in trying to find ways to get 
our own fitness facility. At about this time, there was an article in the state newspaper 
that was distributed with employee paychecks about the new physical fitness facility in 
the Capitol Building for employees on Capitol Hill. I visited the facility to see the layout 
of their exercise equipment I subsequently met with Lynn Velinga and asked him how 
they paid for the equipment in the Capitol's fitness facility. At first he told me Capitol 
Hill employees held bake sales and the proceeds were used to buy the equipment. I told 
Lynn there was no way the proceeds from bake sales would be sufficient to buy the 
equipment presently in the Physical fitness facility. Lynn then told me that if a film 
company used the Capitol or other state facility, they would "request" the rental income 
money be a donation to the Capitol Hill Physical Fitness Facility. I returned to the office 
and apprised Dennis and Ken of this information. I told them I would have to be creative 
like the capitol to finance our Fitness facility. Both told me to proceed and get the fitness 





Meetings were held with our employees. Questionnaires were distributed for 
them to complete asking if they would join the facility if it were available and be willing 
to pay a monthly fee, and what type of exercise equipment they wanted the Department to 
obtain. Almost everybody advised they would join and use the facility and be willing to 
pay a reasonable monthly fee. I was then instructed by Ken and Dennis to acquire 
equipment for the fitness facility. 
Dennis was on the Board of Directors at Beehive Credit Union. This coupled 
with my using my SSN enabled the Candy Account to get a loan. The Department could 
not get a loan using the Department Federal ID Number. A few times prior to the 
Department receiving the initial equipment, Dennis came to my office and told me to get 
moving on the training facility. He said Ken was getting impatient and wanted to get the 
gym setup. 
At first we bought used equipment. One of the first pieces of equipment was a 
used Trotter treadmill. We immediately started having problems with this piece of 
equipment as when it was used it drew to many amps causing it to overheat and blow 
fuses. It seemed that Ken was primarily the person using the treadmill when it broke 
down. Ken never said anything to me. It was always Dennis who came to me. I could 
tell by Dennis's attitude and body language when he told me to get the treadmill fixed, 
that Ken was either upset, irritated or both. I knew fixing the treadmill was a priority 
project. Ken used the treadmill early in the morning before the employees arrived. We 
tried everything to reduce the friction that caused the treadmill to draw excessive amps 
and blow fuses. The bed and belt were replaced. We lubricated the bed to reduce the 





overheat and blow fuses. Each time Dennis would come to my office and tell me to get 
the problem resolved as Ken wasn't happy. 
During 1998, Dennis came to my office and said Ken hated his office furniture. 
Ken wanted this furniture replaced with the same furniture (desk and credenzia, etc) he 
had in his old office. A review of purchasing guidelines disclosed that the only office 
furniture the department could purchase was office furniture that was either on state 
contract or manufactured by the prison industries. Dennis advised that Ken did not want 
either of these options. The furniture had to be the same as the furniture he had in his old 
office. It turned out that the furniture he had before was manufactured by Steelcase and 
was sold by Midwest Office Supply. This furniture was neither on state contract or 
manufactured by prison industries. The desk and credenzia cost $4,171.00 and was paid 
for by a cashier's check. The table cost $985.00 and was paid for with a state warrant 
request. 
Employees have always been able to borrow equipment from the Department. If 
an employee had a project and the Department did not have the tool, the Department 
would buy the tool in question. We would then have the tool on hand if the Department 
actually needed the tool at a later date. The maintenance shop and kitchen were covers 
for these expenditures. We needed all types of tools and equipment to maintain our 
stores and office complex. Also, the Department had a first rate kitchen. We were 
always getting kitchen utinsels for our employees to use or support the numerous 
conferences the Department hosted. Our building was popular as it was new and had 
good facilities. If the Department's tools were damaged or stolen, Dennis and Ken 





cover if a person wanted a certain piece of equipment purchased for themselves. Ken 
would never ask for anything. Dennis would always come to my office and request items 
to be purchased. This was not a daily or weekly occurrence. I do not recall how often 
this occurred, but it was frequent. 
Examples of employees damaging equipment include, not changing vacuum 
cleaner bags or using it to vacuum up wood chips. At times, the vacuum cleaner bag 
would be so packed with dirt that the bag was hard as concrete and the tube leading to the 
bag would also be full of dirt. The wood chips would restrict movement of the beater bar 
on the vacuum. In both instances, this caused the motor to overheat and burn up and they 
would have to be replaced. 
A wood chipper was ruined as the person who borrowed it left it outside all winter 
causing it to rust. Also, melting snow left in the chipper would refreeze ruining the 
chipper's internal parts. During one winter, a carpet cleaner was left in an unheated 
garage at a home freezing the pump. This ruined both of these items and the chipper and 
carpet cleaner had to be replaced. Dennis told me that Ken had borrowed both items. 
This happened approximately four years ago. 
Two or three years ago Dennis told me to buy at Costco a Tila foodsaver. This 
product vacuum seals food products. Dennis said that Ken and Brad Brown were going 
on a fishing trip to Alaska. Ken wanted this to vacuum pack the fish they were going to 
catch and bring back to Utah. It was purchased. However, the vacuum sealer was ruined 
in Alaska because water was sucked into the motor area and it shorted out the unit I was 





Food, candy, soft drinks, etc was purchased for the office. The candy and drinks 
were purchased for the machines in the office. This was put into the "secret room". This 
was a nickname the employees gave the room as access was restricted. People with 
access would fix breakfast or lunch for themselves or others. This was primarily Ken and 
Dennis. If there were a conference or other activity, I would buy extra food for this 
purpose. Nuts, candy, (red vines, gummy bears, licorice, etc) was specifically purchased 
for Ken and Dennis and was kept on their desk. Employees would go into their offices 
and help their self to these items. If the nuts and candy containers were empty, 
employees would call and ask for replacements from the secret room. This is an example 
of items I was requested to buy but there were so many that they are to numerous to 
recall. Depending upon the item, the items were paid for by cash, credit card, or a 
warrant. Items I purchased were either left in my office or in the secret room and then 
they would disappear. Items taken home were usually taken from the office early in the 
morning before the employees arrived at work. Items also disappeared from the supply 
room in the warehouse and tools from the maintenance area located in a portion of the 
club store. I have been told the following items have been returned to the office since 
initiation of this investigation: snow blower, lawn tractor, storage shed, Circulon cooking 
set, turkey fryer, and a Tila food saver. I purchased the turkey fryer as Dennis said Ken 
wanted it. Dennis returned the other mentioned items. Adolph Trujillo discovered the 
lawn tractor, snow blower, and the unassembled storage shed. The lawn tractor was 
found in our locked fenced parking or storage area adjacent to our North Temple liquor 
store. The snow blower was in the paint room located in the warehouse. The 





on the northeast corner of our property near the new warehouse addition. The tractor and 
snow blower were found in locked areas that required keys to gab access. 
Another example was disk shredders. Data wanted one. Costco was selling them 
for approximately $200.00. I purchased one. Data liked the unit so much that they 
requested two more. I put the two shredders in my office and called Kevin Perry. He 
came to my office and left with the shredders. The two shredders have not been seen 
again in the office unless they were returned after June 27,2003. I was asked why I did 
not say no. This is difficult, but I will try. I know I did wrong. I have always obeyed 
and respected our country's laws. I gradually became desensitized I guess we (I and the 
others in the office) were justifying it because we were not benefiting personally. The 
employees were. I got away from what my true responsibilities were. Also, for the past 
three or four years I was not happy. Ken was getting difficult to work for. Ken also held 
grudges. If you got on has bad side it was difficult to overcome. Also, others did not say 
"no" either. Examples of this are as follows: 
1. The listing committee has five members: Ken, Dennis, Dallas Froisland, Brett 
Clifford, and Wayne Olson. If a new product was presented by Stew Campbell or 
Boyd Harris (deceased) who were close friends of Kens and the other members of 
the committee knew Ken strongly supported the listing, the listing would pass 
even though the Department had numerous products in that category and price 
range. The product would not pass if Ken were indifferent or did not make it 
known that he wanted it approved. 
2. The second example is how Ken treated Kelly Mc Entire and Benito 





Praszynski, an area supervisor. How close I do not know but many rumors about 
their relationship has been circulated in the office. He would take her to Jazz 
games, golfing, clubs, etc. Shawna was a vindictive person and would influence 
Ken in his treatment of others. She used this relationship to criticize Kelly and 
Ben over what she perceived poor work performance. All three worked for 
Dennis. Instead of discussing with Dennis she would go straight to Ken with her 
complaints. Ken then dealt with Kelly and Ben. I do not know how Ken handled 
Kelly and Ben, but I know from their comments that Ken made their lives 
miserable. I asked Dennis why he didn't reign in Shawna or protect Ben and 
Kelly from her since they worked for him. His silence was telling. I could tell it 
bothered him that Shawna reported directly to Ken and did not come to him when 
she had something to say. The situation got so bad that Ben asked a lawyer he 
played basketball with who would be a good hostile work environment lawyer. 
Last year when Ken was gone for a week, Kelly complained to Dennis of the 
hostile work environment resulting from Ken and Shawna's relationship Dennis 
spent the week defusing the problem. Dennis was worried because Kelly's file 
was well documented. Shawna was not discreet in describing her activities with 
Ken and used it as a weapon against others when it suited her. Kelly would 
overhear conversations she had with others as his office was located adjacent to 
hers. He would then document her comments. A large number of the women in 
the office were friendly with Shawna out of fear because of her relationship with 
Ken. Marlene Schmidt called Shawna a mean, vicious person. Another time, 





that I would tell Shawna what Penni had said. Even though I told Penni I would 
not tell Shawna what Penni had said, Penni was concerned and immediately 
called Shawna and told her not to believe anything I might say. There is 
sympathy for Shawna now as she is fighting cancer. 
3. Benito left the department to become a broker with Spirits West. He advised that 
f 
his new supervisor told him the following. Ken Wynn had Mel Stevens, a Utah 
liquor broker, contact Benito's future supervisor a Spirits West to tell him not to 
hire Benito. I think Mel sold some or all of his lines to Spirits West. This is an 
example of how mean and vindictive Ken can be. He doesn't do questionable 
things himself but uses other people to get what he wants done or accomplished. 
On occasion, Ken has made inappropriate comments regarding women. An example 
of this is as follows. Dennis told me that during a NABCA Administrators Conference, 
Ken was counseled by Jim Squi (phonetic), an NABCA Administrator, on the proper way 
to treat women. Ken apparently had been drinking too much and made either 
inappropriate comments or advances. I believe the conference was in New Hampshire. 
Dennis also told me that Billy Hestor, a North Carolina county liquor administrator, 
called him and told him that he had counseled Ken the previous evening on the proper 
way to treat women. Ken again had been drinking too much and either made 
inappropriate comments, advances or both. I do not know the specific details regarding 
either situation but I do know that Dennis was concerned and that's why he discussed it 
with me. I am sure that Dennis also told this information to Dallas and Earl. 
On two other occasions, Dennis said he overheard Ken make inappropriate comments 





something to Shawna like she had nice "tits". Another time Ken told Shawna she had a 
nice "ass". Dennis could easily overhear this as he and Ken have adjoining offices. The 
door between their offices is usually open. I know Dallas and Earl knew of these 
comments. I discussed this with both of them and they both cringed. Nobody stepped up 
to Ken and discussed with him his and Shawna's relationship. I know that this was 
because they were afraid of potentially incurring his wrath. 
Ken traveled for NABCA and he was reimbursed by NABCA. Every time he 
traveled he traveled by airplane. According to Dennis, he would however get reimbursed 
for mileage as if he drove an automobile instead of the cost of an airplane ticket. I was 
told that the reimbursement for mileage would be more than the cost of an advance 
purchased airplane ticket and he could then pocket the difference. I asked Dennis why he 
didn't file his vouchers claiming mileage instead of the actual cost of the airplane ticket 
and replied that only Directors were allowed to do this. 
Ernie had his heart attack during the latter part of calendar year 2000 and either 
retired or is drawing disability payments. We kept in touch. He was always short of 
money and was always borrowing money. On two occasions, dates not recalled, he said 
his home was in foreclosure. He needed $3000.00 each time. Each time I discussed this 
with Rae Jordison and then Ken. Each time Ken approved the loan and the money was 
given to Ernie. The second time Ken said to tell Ernie that this would be the last loan. I 
told this to Ernie. Ernie had to know that Ken knew about the loans and that the money 
was not mine. 
Shortly after Ken's second term as president of NABCA, Ken took Earl Dorius, 





present and made comments about their husbands. He stated that he could depend upon 
me to obtain anything he needed. 
Shawna was jealous and possessive person regarding her relationship with Ken. One 
time, within the last three or four years, Ken called MarJean Short on has cell phone 
while he was in San Francisco. He was in front of a shop and saw something she might 
be interested in. When Shawna found out Ken called MarJean and not her, Shawna was 
very upset and let others in the office know about it. 
One afternoon after work, date not known, Ken and Shawna were going out together 
for the evening. Kelly overheard Shawna ask Ken in a low voice if she was following 
him or he was following her. 
On another occasion, Kelly overheard Dennis talking with Ron White, former DABC 
maintenance supervisor. They were discussing the purchase of power tools for the 
Department Dennis told Ron to purchase an extra tool of each type for him (Dennis). 
Kelly advised me that Dennis and Ken would use the Department's store auditors to 
manipulate the system to buy expensive single malt scotch at a bargain price. Dennis 
and/or Ken would search each store's inventory on the computer identifying which store 
had one or two bottles of a slow moving single malt scotch. They were also on the 
lookout for "leakers" of single malt scotch. Leakers could not be sold and would be 
charged back to the company that sold them to the Department. After the single malts 
were located, the store auditors, normally Jerry Bauman, went out to the stores to pick up 
the breakage or leakers that could not be sold. The leakers were suppose to be destroyed. 
I believe Jerry coded the slow moving items and leakers as distressed merchandise. Ken 





sold for at least $30.00. The department lost revenue on these transactions. I knew 
something like this was going on, but did not know the details. I had overheard one of 
the auditors talking with Dennis about this. He asked Dennis if he needed anything as he 
was going to the stores and would pick it up for him. The auditor indicated that after the 
bottle was coded on the transfer, the bottle would disappear in the system. 
Both Dallas and MarJean told me that when Ken and Dennis came to work early they 
would check out the sample room to see what samples were received the previous day. 
Ken would come in as early as 3:00 AM and Dennis would arrive between 4:00 and 5:00 
AM. Both Dallas and MarJean were concerned as they believed vodkas and single malt 
scotches were missing and that either Ken or Dennis or both were taking them. 
As I previously said, the candy fund was always short of money. One day, date not 
recalled, Rae and I were discussing this Rae told me that the checks from Telecheck 
came directly to her and did not go through the normal process. She could give me the 
checks and we could use them and nobody would know. This was because the checks 
were not logged in. 
On numerous occasions, Janise Branstiter would call me. She would advise me that 
she was in possession of a payment or reimbursement. She advised she was going to 
deposit the money into petty cash or the candy fund to be used for the benefit of the 
employees. I concurred. 
Brad Brown at times bragged that I could get anything and that the Department never 
had budget shortages. When he made these comments I was concerned as I wished he 





needed a "dog robber" or scrounger like me. Dallas also knew I was playing financial 
games to buy the equipment and certificates. He didn't know how I was doing it. 
On occasion Dallas and I would talk. I expressed concerns about how Dennis and 
Ken could discipline store personnel for taking peanuts when they were getting so much 
more. 
MarJean told me that the whole office knew I was buying items for Ken and Dennis. 
They would see me leave and return with numerous items that would either go to their 
respective offices or to the secret room. 
Ken would make it difficult for his managers to supervise. He would become 
friendly with certain employees that he liked being with. For example, Adolph and Ernie 
Trujillo were welcomed'in his office at any time. They would come to Ken's office and 
while there they would criticize their supervisor, Ron White. Ron wasn't the best 
supervisor, but he did not have a chance. I told Dennis that Jesus couldn't supervise 
Adolph or Ernie. No matter what Ron did, Adolph and Ernie would go to Ken. Ken 
would then get involved with Dennis, Ron's supervisor, and discipline Ron. He also 
became friendly with Harlene Buccabusso, an accounting technician. She would 
complain about Rae's negative management style. It was difficult to defend Rae as he 
(Ken) had already made up his mind based upon what Harlene had told him. Others in 
the office defended Rae to me saying Harlene was lazy, made numerous errors, and read 
the newspaper the first couple of hours each day. It was a difficult situation for me until 
Harlene retired. I don't even think that Rae was aware of the situation since I didn't 
discuss it with Rae as I didn't think that Harlene's comments had merit. Ken allowed 





mind. With Rae, his mind was already made up based upon Harlene's comments. Once 
Harlene left, Rae's situation improved as Ken never brought the topic up again. 
Ken states that he signed blank checks and did not know what they were for. He did 
this on occasion. However, the vast majority of the time I would go to him to get a check 
signed and he would ask me what the check was for. I would tell him the purpose of the 
check. If Ken did not ask me what the check was for and signed checks not knowing 
their purpose, he was not fulfilling his responsibilities as the Director. He was 
responsible to know what the check was for before he signed the check. The same 
applies to Dennis. The Commission secretary had Dennis and Ken's signature stamp 
locked in a cabinet. I did not have the key. If I needed a second signature and Dennis 
and Ken were not there, I would explain to the secretary what the check was for before 
she stamped the check. If nobody was there, I was out of luck as the check didn't get 
signed and I would have to wait until the next day. 
Lynn Staley told me that he has done many small things for Ken. One example, he 
and Ken took a generator from the office to Ken's house in a state van. He said you do 
not say no to Ken. He also told me that he knew I was buying items for Ken and Dennis 
as he went shopping with me several times and saw what I was buying and knew who it 
was for. 
Another example is that Dennis told me to buy a color printer for Ken's home. I 
purchased the printer. Then during working hours, Ken drove Chris Christensen, a 
department employee, in a state van to his house to setup and install the printer for him. 
Our store auditors gave the Budweiser and Carlson checks to me. They worked with 





buy certificates and/or exercise equipment. I do not remember the details of the checks 
for surplus property and don't remember them coming to me. Also, I don't remember 
anything about the reimbursement check for Dennis travel for NABCA. 
I did not have contact with Telecheck, the beer distributors, etc. Other employees had 
contact with these organizations. I did not open the mail. Other employees opened the 
mail. I was not the lone ranger doing the actions that I have been accused and charged 
with. A lot of people in the office were involved with me and I did not ever use threats or 
intimidation. I did not reconcile the bank statements. In fact, I rarely ever saw them as 
they were reconciled and filed by others. Nobody in the office ever questioned the 
checks or deposits to petty cash. I have been told that I am missed and that the 
employees want to help me but are afraid of reprisals or repercussions that may result. 
It is preposterous that Ken and Dennis thought that the Candy money paid for 
employee certificates, gym equipment, loan payments, etc. Candy fund profits could not 
possibly have paid for these items. Other employees knew along with Ken and Dennis. 
If Ken had wanted it stopped he could have done it at any time but instead did nothing. 
In sexual harassment and hostile work environment situations I believe the supervisor 
cannot say he did not know the situation existed. It is his responsibility to know and 
correct the situation. It is the same with this situation. If he claims he didn't know, he 
should have! 
Listed below is the money we are talking about: 
Recycling incentives $ 15,596.71 
Sparta checks $25,777.22 
Telechecks $25,101.03 
Budweiser/Carlson $ 6,272.00 
DABC surplus property $ 2,495.00 






The candy fund made money but I do not know how much. I did not take the 
money out of the machines nor did I count the receipts. I received money from Rae 
Jordison from time to time to buy merchandise. I would also check with her to see how 
much additional money we needed for certificates at yearend. Listed below are 

































Cash to employees in lieu of certificates 
1999 $ 600.00 
2000 $ 600.00 
2001 $ 600.00 
2002 $ 600 00 $ 2,400.00 
Smiths Certificates $ 2.000 00 
TOTAL $56,213.20 
In addition to the above, the Department, with Ken's approval, loaned Ernie 





the department books or inventory record for these items, as they were not paid for out of 
the departmental funds but with the diverted money: 
Loans to Ernie Trujillo $ 6,000.00 
Ken's office furniture $ 4,171.00 
Chipper $ 1,450.00 
Lawn Tractor $ 2,499.00 
Lawn Tractor $ 2.499.00 (approximately)* 
TOTAL $16,000.00 
After the investigation opened, Dennis came to my office and asked how Dora, 
my wife, was taking the situation. I told him that she was very upset and distraught. I 
told Dennis that based on what I told her, she thought that he, Ken, and everybody else in 
the office was just as guilty as me. Dennis concurred. Also, during one of our 
conversations, Dennis said that if the State did not like how we financed the gym that the 
State should investigate other agencies to determine how their fitness facilities were 
financed. 
Benito told me that Shauna in the presence of him, Karen Stackhouse, Bill 
Garner, and others said that she, Shauna, and Ken were going out that night. Karen made 
the comment that the "old man was going to get lucky tonight". 
Shortly after the Jerry Seiner dealership opened on 5th West near our office 
Dennis came to my office. He said that the dealership had a good drive thru car wash. 
The car wash was open to the public. Tokens could be purchased to wash state vehicles. 
Tokens could also be given to certain employees to wash their own vehicles. I went to 
Jerry Seiners to purchase tokens and found out that tokens were not issued but paper 
receipts with a code number that was to be entered prior to getting the vehicle washed. 
The receipts were only valid for 30 days. A credit card could not be used to purchase the 





car washes. I gave Dennis 4 or 5 of these receipts every time a purchase was made and 
the balance of the receipts to Janice. Dennis used these receipts to wash his personal 
vehicle(s). Others also used these car wash receipts to wash their own vehicles by going 
to Janice and indicating that they were going to wash a state vehicle and then would turn 
around and use it on their persona] vehicle. 
Several years ago Ken had the interior of his house painted. I believe our 
maintenance people purchased the paint, brushes, rollers, etc for this job. Also, when 
Ken was roofing his house the department purchased the nails and tarpaper for this job. 
Ken purchased the shingles but the department purchased an air gun that was used to nail 
the shingles to the roof. 
At his house, Dennis had a workshop attached to his house. I think that the 
department also purchased tools that he had in his workshop. Dennis made oak furniture. 
I do know that the oak Dennis used to make the furniture was purchased by our 
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AGI Distributing, Inc. 
3601 South 2700 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
(801)635-4756 
February 8, 2004 
Ms. Pegeen Stewart 
RE: Character Reference Letter for Mr. Richard Pearson 
Dear Ms. Stewart: 
I have owned and operated a business for 15 years that is located in the West Valley area. 
Presently I reside in West Jordan In addition to my duties as a business owner I provide 
for my family of five and hold a calling in my church. I am also involved with charitable 
organizations such as being a volunteer in the Big Brother/Big Sister program for three 
years. Organizations such as this, return to me much more satisfaction than the time that I 
offer them. 
I have known Richard Pearson for the past thirteen years. During this time Richard has 
been a return customer to my business. During the last several years Richard and I have 
formed a personal relationship and spend much free time together. Based on my 
assessment of his character over this time I have come to discern that he is honest, sincere, 
loyal and a very good father. He also spends countless hours performing volunteer work, 
with children and agencies geared to help children. As my personal relationship has grown 
with Richard, I have also learned much concerning his honesty and integrity. As a tribute 
to his honesty the following accounts are briefly provided: 
A few years ago Richard visited our video game store in West Valley to trade some games 
and purchase others, it was very busy that day, and our sales clerk, had given him credit 
for one of his games twice. The following day Richard noticed this additional credit on his 
receipt and called to return the money. As small business owner, I very much appreciated 
this act since small amounts greatly impact our profitability and my own livelihood. 
In the past I have also observed him inform a waitress at a restaurant of an ordered item 
that she failed to place on his bill and charge him tor. 
Based on my information concerning Richard's character if the opportunity arose I would 
immediately hire Richard to oversee the financial aspects of my business due to his 
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AGI Distributing, Inc. 
3601 South 2700 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
(801) 635-4756 
Richard's single most positive character trait is his countless hours he spends conducting 
volunteer work with children. He has spent the last 10 years volunteering for the Sparta 
United Soccer Club. I have been invited to work with him on numerous fund raising 
activities for the club. As a person who does volunteer work, I can very much appreciate 
his efforts for the children. 
Richard's one fault in life is that he consistently places the needs and concerns of other 
people before his own. Based on my personal knowledge, Richard is an outstanding part 
of our community that makes this world just a little bit better. 
Thank you for your valuable time. If you have any questions or desire further information 
please do not hesitate to contact me at (801) 635-4756 or write to the above address. 
Gary R. Parker 
President 
® 
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From: "Sparta United Soccer Club" <sparta@spartaunited.com> 
To: Pegeen Stewart 
Date: Friday - February 6, 2004 11:37 AM 
Subject: Richard Pearson 
$ Mime 822 (1729 bytes) Mfflafl i§am&A 
J am writing to you in regards to Richard Pearson. I have known Richard 
for seven years, since his son, Trevor joined the soccer club. 
Richard is the hardest worker in the organization. He will volunteer to 
help, no matter the task. It would be impossible to calculate the hours of 
service Richard has devoted to the soccer community. 
Richard sincerely cares about the welfare of the children. If a child does 
not have the financial resources to play or travel to out of state 
tournaments, Richard makes sure the player is able to participate with his 
team. 
Richard does not expect recognition or accolades for his work. He receives 
the reward of knowing he Is helping the children. 
Sincerely, 
Ben Vanden hazel 
N 
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From: Lynn Staley 
To: Pegeen Stewart 
Date: Friday - February 6,200411:42 AM 
Subject: Richard Pearson 
February 4, 2004 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I am writing to you to provide a character reference for Richard Pearson whom t have known as a supervisor, 
administrator and friend for a period of 28 years. 
I first met Richard in 1976 and since that time I have had the opportunity of knowing and working with him in a 
variety of projects and situations. Many successes with which I have been credited are a direct result of Richard's 
counsel and advice. 
With integrity, with caring, with determination and an unselfish respect for those who may be struggling, Richard has 
exuded concern and motivated me and others in a way that has been supportive and accepting. I believe that our 
department's history of high morale and low employee turn-over can be partly attributed to Richard's influence. 
Of those many times when I have confided in and sought Richard's in-put and opinion, I've admired his well balanced 
style and his emphasis to loyalty. I have visited him recently and I am aware that he feels great remorse for the 
unfortunate mistakes that he has made. I can assure you that he does recognize their seriousness and the impact 
those mistakes have had on our department and our state. 
With regard to Richard's guilty pleas and the issues concerning his trust and responsibility, I emphatically believe that 
it would be to the advantage of all that his sentence may be restricted to probation. 
Richard is, and will always be, one of the finest people that I have ever met. I am happy to write this in his behalf 
and I thank you for taking the time to read It. 
Most sincerely, 
Lynn Staley 




I have known Richard Pearson for almost 33 years. He married my sister. He has 
been a good provider for his family and very supportive to members of my family, 
especially my mother, brother, and uncle. 
When Richard married into my family it did not take long for him to become an 
important part of our lives. My mother thought the world of him and they became 
not only family but also the best of friends. He was always so kind and spent a lot of 
time with her. He took my mother on trips, bought her new clothes, and assisted 
her almost every day when she was bedridden and dying from cancer. He would 
drive from Salt Lake City to Ogden to take her to her doctor or to the hospital for 
her treatments. He did his best to make her final days comfortable, My mother 
loved him and he loved her. He was a wonderful son-in-law and brother-in-law. 
During her illness when she needed help he never ever complained or thought of her 
care as a burden. He was always there to help and could never do enough. 
My brother lived in his house before he was killed. He provided him free board and 
room and helped him buy a car. He was not just a brother-in-law but also a good 
friend. When my brother was shot, Richard took the phone call from the police and 
immediately went to the hospital When he arrived at the hospital he was informed 
that my brother had died on the way to the hospital and it was him that notified the 
family. 
His support and kindness during this time was an immense strength to my family 
and me, 
I also had an uncle who was over 70 years old and lived with my mother. When my 
mother passed away, my wife and I moved into her house and tried to take care of 
him but we were young and it was hard so Richard and my sister moved him into 
their home and became his caregiver. My uncle had been a bachelor all his life and 
had no other immediate family still living. During the years my uncle lived with 
them he became increasing worse and eventually lost complete control of his bodily 
functions. Every day, up to the time of his death, Richard would go home and clean, 
bath, and dress my uncle. Richard never complained or looked on this as a burden. 
He was always there when help was needed. My uncle lived with them until his 
death and I know it was not an easy time for them but they did this out of love for 
him and for my mother, as her last wish was that her brother was taken care of 
when she was gone. They never even thought or considered taking the easy way out 
and putting him in a nursing home. I am proud to say he is my brother-in-law and I 
consider him like a brother. My family and sister are blessed to have him. 
For approximately 12 years Richard has been involved in youth soccer. My 
personal experience has been during the past year. He coached my daughter's U-6" 
girls soccer team. They could not find anybody in the Roy area to coach the team so 
we asked Richard to do it He drove three times a week from Sandy to Roy to train 
the girls. All of the parents will tell you they trust and treasure him. The little girls 





I was 21 when my mother died. Richard has been very good to me ever since he 
came into our family. There is nothing he wouldn't do for my family or me. I have 
always looked up to him and I know that I can count on him. He is a kindhearted 
person. I can honestly say that I have never heard him say an unkind word about 
others. I know that he cares about others and has a big heart and would never 
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February 5,2004 
Pegcen Stewart 
A case before you concerning Richard Pearson 
Richard has been a friend, is a friend and will be a friend in the future, having said that. I 
recognize that mistakes have been made, 
I have known Richard for about twenty-five years. Over those years I have come to like 
the man. 1 have come to know him as generous and willing to help when I have been in 
need. 
I believe, in this case, there is room for leniencyand compassion. That is my pica. 
Thank you for receiving my note and considering this plea, 
Dallas R. Froisland 
Director of Purchasing 





TO; STATE OF UTAH 
ATTN: PEG STEWART 
633-9429 FAX 239-2184 
SUBJECT: LETTER OF CHARACTER 
RICHARD PEARSON 
I HAVE KNOW RICHARD FOR ABOUT TWENTY YEARS, I HAVE KNOWN 
HIM BOTH THRU BUSINESS AND COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES. 
RICHARD IS A COMMUNITY SERVICE ORIENTED PERSON HELPING MANY 
OF THE LOCAL YOUTHS THRU ATHLETICS. HE IS A DEDICATED INDIVIDUAL 
IN HELPING MANY OF HIS ASSOCIATES . HE IS A GOOD LOYAL FRIEND. 
HOWAjfe RINDU^VCHER 
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FAX NO. 18014874126 P. 01 
Att; Peggy Stewart 
From: Ellen Molletti 
Dear Peggy, 
As an account, executive representing my previous company I had the privilege of doing 
business with Richard Pearson for five years. He has been very mvolved in the soccer 
community, and well respected by his associates at Sparta United. 
As one forms a working relationship over several years, you do get to know a person over 
time, it is my opinion that Richard is straight forward, and cared about his associated and 
staff He is an upstanding member of the community. I have also got to know some of the 
employees at DABC and it is my understanding that Richard was and is well respected, 
trusted, and liked by his peers at DABC. 






























IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD WARREN PEARSON, 
Defendant. 




BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 20th day of 
February, 2004, commencing at the hour of 9:02 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
t& 
FEB - 2 2005 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
CLARK A. HARMS 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Attorney at Law 
4659 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City,-.Utah 84117 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB 0 3 2005 
fyJMJLl Deputy Clerk 
ORIGINAL 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
365 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. RASMUSSEN: Your Honor, we're ready on No. 19, 
the Pearson matter. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
State of Utah vs. "Richard Warren Pearson. This is 
Case No. CR03848. 
ftr. Rasmussen, you're here on behalf of this 
defendant? 
MR. RASMUSSEN: Correct. 
THE COURT: And for the State? 
MR. HARMS: Clark Harms for the State, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Harms. Thank you. 
And you are Richard Warren Pearson; is that correct, 
sir? 
MR. PEARSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Rasmussen is your lawyer; is that 
correct? 
MR. RASMUSSEN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: For the record, this is the time set for 
sentencing. The defendant entered pleas of guilty on the 19th 
of December of last year, to five separate second-degree 
felony charges, misuse of public money, two counts; theft, one 
count; and communications fraud, the fifth count, one count on 
that one. 
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A pre-sentence report was then ordered, has now been 
received and reviewed. 
Mr. Rasmussen, you've seen that report? 
MR, RASMUSSEN: I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is there any legal reason known to you 
why I should not impose sentence at this time? 
MR. RASMUSSEN: I am not aware of one. 
THE COURT: Before I do so, do you wish to say 
anything on behalf of Mr. Pearson? 
MR. RASMUSSEN: I do, your Honor. 
With respect to the pre-sentence report, just a 
couple of comments. First of all, the Court may recall that 
at the time that we entered the pleas, there was a 
recommendation by the State that no prison be imposed and that 
the sentences on all five counts run concurrently. We 
understand that the final decision is vested in the Court, but 
I wanted just to reiterate those recommendations as they were 
stipulated to at the time of the plea. 
Having said that, we agree with the recommendations 
in the pre-sentence report. We think that the pre-sentence 
report is thoughtful. We think that it takes into account the 
fact that Mr. Pearson has never been in trouble before* We 
think it takes into account the motivation behind some of the 
deeds which he did and we would ask the Court to follow the 
recommendations as they're outlined. 
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THE COURT: All right, Mr, Rasmussen. Thank you. 
Mr. Pearson, before I decide what to be done here, 
do you have anything to say? 
MR. PEARSON: No* I'm just sorry it happened, I 
wish I would have had the strength to say no, at the time. 
I'm sorry to put my family through all this distress and 
embarrassment and just apologize to the Court and to the State 
and everybody else involved. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Pearson. 
Mr. Harms, does the State have a recommendation? 
MR. HARMS: Your Honor, Ms* Cameron's 
recommendation, which I make on her behalf, was that Mr. 
Pearson receive concurrent sentences and that he not be 
sentenced to prison at this time. 
THE COURT: And—and that is specified in the pre-
sentence agreement— 
MR. HARMS: Yes. 
THE COURT: —as her recommendation? 
MR. HARMS: It is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything contrary to what is 
recommended here by A P & P? 
MR. HARMS: No, your Honor, just to point out again, 
I know the Court is well aware of this case, but the State, in 
a sense, is truly the victim in this case, as opposed to where 
we stand in place of the victim, where Mr. Pearson had the 
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gate-keeper function at the Division of Alcohol Beverage 
Control, was responsible for improper use of State funds and 
in the discharge of his duties, misappropriated over $130,000, 
of which $53,793 went directly to his personal accounts. 
In addition, since these charges were filed, the 
A.B.C. was required to pay off a Costco credit card bill, the 
entirety of which were purchases for Mr. Pearson's personal 
benefit. That amounts to $6,856. We're requesting 
restitution in the amount of $60,649. 
I believe that Mr. Pearson is contesting the 
restitution and so we'd be asking the Court to set a 
restitution hearing. 
THE COURT: The number that's contained within the 
pre-sentence report specifically is 131,541.13. Does that 
number include your 53 plus 6,800? 
MR. HARMS: No. It does not include the 6,800. 
That number is the number that the Utah State Auditor's Office 
came up with as the total amount misappropriated; however, the 
auditors also determined about 76,000 were improper 
disbursements, but went to the benefit of the department or 
other department members. And so, they're not quite sure how 
to deal with that and your Honor's going to have to decide 
that at the restitution hearing. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Harms. Thank you. 
Then there is no legal reason why I should not 
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impose sentence at this time— 
MR. RASMUSSEN: No. 
THE COURT: —known to you, Mr. Rasmussen? 
MR. RASMUSSEN: No. 
THE COURT: It is the judgment and sentence of this 
Court, Mr. Pearson, that you serve the term provided by law in 
the Utah State Prison of one to 15 years for each of the five 
separate second-degree felony charges to which you have pled 
guilty. I will order that those terms be served consecutively 
and not concurrently* 
I will, based upon the recommendations that have 
been made to me and the fact that you have no prior criminal 
history whatsoever, suspend the imposition of the prison term 
and place you on probation subject to the following terms and 
conditions: 
One. You will serve a term in the Adult 
Detention Center of 1$0 days. 
You will complete cognitive restructuring 
classes. 
You will pay restitution in the amount of 
$131,541.14 until such time and if that number is modified by 
this Court. 
And you will make regular monthly installment 
payments on that amount so that the ultimate conclusion will 
be that at the end of your 36-month probation, which I am 
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placing you on, that sum will be paid in full. 
You will not be employed during the course of 
this probationary term in a position of financial 
responsibility where you hav& access to the money of other 
persons. 
You will make restitution as I have indicated 
during the course of your probationary term and that will 
commence at such time as the order is signed. 
Now, Mr. Pearson, do you understand? 
MR. PEARSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: I am of the view at this stage that the 
restitution sum will be as I've indicated unless I modify it 
and that leaves open the potential for negotiation between 
your lawyer and those at the State who do have knowledge about 
what their records reflect. If there is no satisfactory 
conclusion by either party, then you're to notify this Court, 
Mr. Rasmussen, and I will set the matter for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
MR. RASMUSSEN: Thank you, 
THE COURT: At which time, all of the claims will be 
inquired into and a determination will be made; but until and 
unless that occurs, the number is now specified. 
MR. RASMUSSEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Mr. Pearson, you are to report to the 
Adult Detention Center Monday morning, next, at 9:00 a.m. for 
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your 150 days' service. 
Is there anything further? 
MR. HARMS: Yes, your Honor. The statutes provided 
for, and the information provided notice of, a request on 
behalf of the State that this Court, pursuant to Section 
76-8-404, disqualify Mr. Peatson from the—any public office 
or public employment for the rest of his life. 
THE COURT: Well, that, of course, will be the 
order— 
MR. HARMS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: --since it is statutorily required. 
MR. HARMS: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. RASMUSSEN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Good luck to you folks. 
MR. RASMUSSEN: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: You bet. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings; tfiat I received an electronically 
recorded videotape of the within matter and under his 
supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting, and 
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 8, inclusive, to the 
best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney 
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of 
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise 
interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 27th day of 
January, 2005. 
Transcriber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this " day 
of January, 2005. 
Notary Public 
( S E A L ) 
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THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN, #2693 Ql$ r&.?&-• 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
Case No. 031906848 
Judge: ^ E ^ S C J ^ L 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, Attorney for Defendant, hereby requests 
an Order to Withdraw as Counsel from the above-entitled matter, 
based on the fact that all legal services for which Counsel was 
retained have been completed and resolved. 
DATED this \(p day of July, 2004. 
QflsTnoi?) V ^afr/muAfrgrru 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The foregoing Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and Order to 
Withdraw as Counsel was hand delivered/facsimiled/mailed postage 
pre-paid to the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, 111 East 
Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Defendant: 
Richard Pearson 
11 Mountainwood Lane 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
DATED this day of July, 2004. 
*r^ 
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON #1607 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD WARREN PEARSON, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE 
AS COUNSEL, MOTION FOR 
RESTITUTION HEARING AND 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
Case No. 031906848 
Comes now, John Blair Hutchison, Attorney at Law, who hereby enters his appearance as 
counsel for the defendant in the above-entitled matter upon the charges of: THREE (3) 
COUNTS OF MISUSE OF PUBLIC MONEY, THEFT and COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD and 
further, requests a Restitution Hearing on behalf of said defendant. Pursuant to Rule 16, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor is requested to furnish documentation as to how 
the Restitution amount of $131,541.13 was calculated that the defendant has been ordered to 
pay. 
DATED this 8th day of September 2004. 
CLtZ VLotzn—> 
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON 
1/ Attorney for Defendant 
State v. Pearson 
CaseNo.031906848 
Entry of Appearance and Motion for 
Restitution Hearing and Discovery 
Page 2 of 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I faxed and/or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
original on the 8th day of September 2004 to the following: 
Anne A. Cameron 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
2001 S. State #S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Fax: 801-468-2622 
Court Clerk 
Third District Court 
450 S. State Street 
P.O. Box 1860 































IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD WARREN PEARSON, 
Defendant. 




BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of 
October, 2004, commencing at the hour of 10:40 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: ANNE AVERY CAMERON 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
For the Defendant: 
FILES BISTBIGT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
liyJM 
FEB - 2 2005 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
Attorney at Law 
Yengich, Rich & Xaiz 
175 East 400 South, #400 
Salt Lake City. JItah 84111 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SALT LAKE COUNTY FCB 0 3 2005 
af^TTH, 
ORIGINAL 
Deputy CI&!*AN P. SMI CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. YENGICH: Good morning, your Honor. May we do 
State of Utah vs. Richard Pearson. I'm here, standing in for 
John Hutchison. 
THE COURT: What number is that— 
MR. YENGICH: I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: —Mr. Yengich? Is it a sentencing? 
MR. YENGICH: It is a motion that M r . — 
THE CLERK: 11. 
THE COURT: No. 11? 
MR. YENGICH: No. 11. And— 
THE COURT: Very well. State of Utah vs. Richard 
Warren Pearson, Case No. CR03848. Mr. Yengich appearing for 
this defendant and— 
MS. CAMERON: Anne Cameron for the State. 
THE COURT: —and Ms. Cameron for the State. 
And you, sir, are Richard Warren Pearson; is that 
correct? 
MR. PEARSON: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. YENGICH: If—if it please th£ Court? 
THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead, Mr. Yengich. 
MR. YENGICH: Yes. Mr. Hutchison contacted me. He 
is unable to be here today. He has requested that this matter 
be set over for three weeks. And as I understand it, Ms. 
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Cameron has no objection to that. 
MS. CAMERON: That is correct, your Honor; however, 
after speaking with Mr. Yengich, I think three weeks may fall 
on a day where I am not present and we need to change that. 
THE COURT: We'll continue it to the next available 
day—date, in the range of the"" three-week period, if there's 
no objection from the State and I assume, this—this is a 
restitution issue that we're dealing with here, isn't it? 
MR. YENGICH: That is correct, your Honor, 
MS. CAMERON: That's right. 
THE COURT: We'll continue it to— 
THE CLERK: November 5th. 
THE COURT: —November the 5th. 
MS. CAMERON: That will be great. 
MR. YENGICH: Thank you, your Honor. And I'll—and 
Mr. Hutchison will be here on that day. 
THE COURT: Now, I assume that there is effort 
underway to provide the documentation that is to be— 
MS. CAMERON: I've been out of the office for the 
past week, your Honor. I did indicate to Mr. Hutchison, that 
previous defense counsel has all documentation. There were 
thousands of pages of documentation; therefore, my office— 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. CAMERON: —has not reproduced all of those. 
MR. YENGICH: John has indicated to me that he's 
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provided them to a—an accountant to review, so I think they 
have it* 
THE COURT: Okay. So that information's been 
obtained by Mr. Hutchison? 
MR. YENGICH: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And being analyzed at this time. 
MR. YENGICH: It is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr.— 
MR. YENGICH: I— 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. YENGICH: I'm sorry. 
I will advise Mr. Hutchison to be ready on that date 
with that information. 
THE COURT: And you, Mr. Pearson, are in agreement 
with this request to continue this matter for— 
MR. PEARSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: —that period? 
All right. Then if there's nothing further, that'll 
be the order. 
MR. YENGICH: Thank you, your Honor. May we be 
excused? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS. 
) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings; that I received an electronically 
recorded videotape of the within matter and under his 
supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting, and 
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 4, inclusive, to the 
best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney 
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of 
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise 
interested in the event of this suit. 




Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th g[ay 
of January, 2005. 
<S? NOTARY PUBLIC 
' " v A ALAN P SMITH 
» - ft 3S5 BRAHMA DRIVE 
l • -* $ MURRAY, UT 84107 
V * * * $ COMMISSION EXPIRES 
\ ^fJ DECEMBER 4, 2005 
STATE OF UTAH 










IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF vfkW Judicial District 
MOV 1 S 2004 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD WARREN PIERSON, 
Defendant. 
#ALT fcAKI SOUl 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 031906848 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
November 12, 2004 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion for Restitution Hearing and Request for 
Discovery. The Court heard oral argument with respect to the 
Motion on November 5, 2004. Following the hearing, the matter 
was taken under advisement. The Court having considered the 
motion and memoranda, as well as the arguments of counsel, hereby 
enters the following ruling. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (4), Defendant's 
request is untimely as the motion was not made, nor any objection 
voiced, until seven months after the sentencing. Moreover, the 
presentence report in this case provides an accurate outline of 
the amounts misused and their destinations, and defendant had 
access to this report and the discovery which detailed the 
State's accounting. Finally, in State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, 61 
P. 3d 1000, the Utah Supreme Court held that restitution based 
upon the information in a presentence report is a sufficient 
basis upon which the Court may determine an order of restitution. 
In light of the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Restitution 
Hearing and Request for Discovery is not well taken and, 
accordingly, denied. 
DATED this /V^clay of November, 2004. 
ipufy Stark 
v * i iff 
. ~jy 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 031906848 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail ANNE A CAMERON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
111 E BROADWAY STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON 
ATTORNEY DEF 
427 27TH ST 
OGDEN UT 84401 
Dated t h i s \[p \ i ay of V\c\f , , 2 0 (\\\ . 
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Deputy Court Clerk 
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